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I. INTRODUCTION
It is late at night. You and your friend, Bob, have just finished
your workout at the YMCA and he is giving you a ride home. On the
way, Bob is stopped for a minor traffic offense. As Bob pulls the car
to the side of the road, he hands you a piece of gum but you decide to
chew it later, so you put the gum in your pocket. Bob stops the car
and the officer approaches. While the officer is at the window of the
car, Bob starts to reach down between the seat and door to open the
trunk because his wallet is in his gym bag, in the trunk.
Before you know it, you and Bob are ordered out of the car to
submit to a pat-down frisk because the officer interpreted your
movements as indications that one or both of you might be armed and
dangerous. That is, he saw you put something in your pocket before
the car was stopped, and Bob reached for something under the seat
while the officer was standing at the window. During the frisk, the
officer feels a small hard object in your front pants pocket that is
clearly not a weapon. It could be a tire valve, an aspirin, or a balled
up foil wrapper. In fact, it is the piece of gum that Bob handed you.
Nevertheless, the officer reaches into your pocket and grabs it because
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his experience leads him to believe that the object feels like a small
piece of crack or cocaine.'
The preceding hypothetical is an example of the type of search
that may be upheld under the United States Supreme Court's recent
ruling in Minnesota v. Dickerson2 and the Washington Supreme
Court's decision in State v. Hudson.3 These rulings state that the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution4 permits the
seizure of contraband during a protective search for weapons based on
the sense of touch under two conditions: (1) the search must not
exceed the scope of a Terry frisk,' and (2) the contraband nature of the
object must be immediately apparent to the officer.6 Permission to
seize contraband under these two conditions is known as the "plain
feel" or "plain touch" doctrine. By their adoption of this doctrine, the
United States and Washington Supreme Courts have extended the
rationale for conducting a pat-down search beyond the traditional
concern for the safety of officers and bystanders, to include the
discovery of contraband, that is, evidence of a crime.
Although some state and federal courts recognized the plain feel
doctrine before the Supreme Court's decision in Dickerson,7 Washing-
ton courts did not. In 1982, in State v. Broadnax,8 the Washington
Supreme Court expressly stated that the plain feel doctrine should not
be recognized in Washington because the "tactile sense does not
usually result in the immediate knowledge of the nature of the item."9
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied primarily on two United
1. This hypothetical is roughly based on the facts of a case that is currently pending before
the Washington State Court of Appeals, Division II. Brief of Appellant at 2-4, State v. Goforth,
No. 18109-6-11, (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 1994).
2. 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
3. 124 Wash. 2d 107, 874 P.2d 160 (1994).
4. The Washington Supreme Court declined to consider whether Hudson was entitled to
more protection under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution because the issue was
not raised until his supplemental brief. Hudson, 124 Wash. 2d at 120, 874 P.2d at 167.
5. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Under the holding in Terry, an officer may
conduct a reasonable search for weapons when the officer has reason to believe that the individual
is armed and dangerous. This is true regardless of whether the officer has probable cause to arrest
the individual. Id. at 27. The search must be confined in scope to the discovery of "guns,
knives, dubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer." Id. at 29. The
sole rationale for permitting such a search is the protection of officers and others nearby. Id.
6. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137; see also Hudson, 124 Wash. 2d at 114, 874 P.2d at 164.
7. See Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2134-35 n.1.
8. 98 Wash. 2d 289, 654 P.2d 96 (1982).
9. Id. at 298, 654 P.2d at 102.
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States Supreme Court decisions: Ybarra v. Illinois'° and Sibron v.
New York. "
Despite Washington's rejection of tactile recognition of contraband
in Broadnax, in 1994 the Washington Supreme Court reversed its
position. 2  In State v. Hudson, the Washington court expressly
adopted the plain feel doctrine, relying exclusively on the Fourth
Amendment and the holding in Dickerson.'3
Despite their adoption of the plain feel doctrine, however, both
the Dickerson and Hudson courts refused to admit the evidence in
question. In Dickerson, the Court held that the evidence was properly
excluded because the officer exceeded the permissible scope of the pat-
down frisk by manipulating the contraband with his finger. 4
Similarly, in Hudson, the court remanded the case for a determination
of whether the officer impermissibly manipulated the object before
determining that it was contraband. 5
This Comment argues that Washington should return to an
independent analysis of search and seizure doctrine under article I,
section 7 of the state constitution and reject the admission of contra-
band seized during the course of a pat-down frisk.16 The decisions
in Hudson and Dickerson have established an unnecessary and
unworkable standard, and involve an increased invasion of personal
privacy without the counter-balancing need to protect the safety of
others.
The plain feel doctrine as announced in Dickerson and Hudson
developed from two well-established concepts in search and seizure
law-the Terry frisk of persons to discover weapons and the plain view
10. 444 U.S. 85, 92-93 (1979) (holding that the officer was not permitted to frisk a patron
of a bar without a reasonable suspicion that the patron was armed and dangerous).
11. 392 U.S. 40, 65-66 (1968) (finding that the officer exceeded the permissible scope of a
Terry frisk when he reached into the defendant's pocket to retrieve drugs).
12. See Hudson, 124 Wash. 2d at 114-15, 874 P.2d at 164-65.
13. See id. at 109, 114-16, 874 P.2d at 161, 164-65. Neither the Washington Supreme
Court nor the United States Supreme Court overruled any prior decisions in their holdings.
Rather, the Washington Supreme Court described the holding in Hudson as consistent with
Broadnax because "Broadnax merely acknowledged that touch alone cannot 'usually' result in
immediate recognition of contraband." Id. at 115, 874 P.2d at 165. Similarly, in Dickerson, the
United States Supreme Court found that the decision was anticipated by Ybarra. Dickerson, 113
S. Ct. at 2137-38 n.4. Yet, because the facts in Dickerson were so similar to the facts in Sibron,
the search "amounted to the sort of evidentiary search that Tery expressly refused to authorize."
Id. at 2139 (citations omitted).
14. 113 S. Ct. at 2133, 2139.
15. 124 Wash. 2d at 118-20, 874 P.2d at 166-67.
16. While the plain feel doctrine has been applied to searches of containers and the seizure
of non-contraband evidence, this Comment is limited to the seizure of contraband in the context
of a Tery frisk.
1995]
Seattle University Law Review
doctrine. Both concepts involve specific exceptions to the requirement
of the Fourth Amendment that searches may be conducted only with
the authorization of a warrant. Accordingly, Part II describes the
principles of the Terry frisk and the plain view doctrine. Part III
details the Supreme Court's decision in Dickerson. Part IV discusses
the holdings of the primary search and seizure cases decided in
Washington before Dickerson, and is followed, in Part V, by a
description of the two Washington cases that have been decided since
Dickerson. Part VI is a brief discussion of Washington constitutional
analysis, laying the groundwork for distinguishing the right to privacy
under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution from the
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the
Fourth Amendment. Finally, Part VII argues that Washington courts
should depart from the ruling in Dickerson and continue to exclude
contraband that is seized during a frisk for weapons because the plain
feel doctrine is unnecessary, unworkable, subject to abuse and, most
importantly, does not adequately protect the privacy interests of
Washington citizens.
II. BACKGROUND: THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND SELECTED
EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
A. The Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule provides that any evidence found as a result
of an illegal search or seizure-one that violates a person's Fourth
Amendment rights--cannot be introduced in a trial. 7 The rule exists
to deter police officers from executing unreasonable searches and
seizures," to protect judicial integrity by preventing courts' involve-
ment in the "willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to
uphold,"' 9 and to maintain popular trust in the government by
assuring citizens that the government will not profit from illegal
conduct.20
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
17. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-93, 398 (1914). The exclusionary
rule also applies to state tribunals. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653 (1961).
18. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 12 (stating that the exclusionary rule "has been recognized
as a principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct"); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.1(b) (2d ed. 1992).
19. Elkins v. United States., 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960).
20. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 394; LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 18, § 3.1(b).
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unreasonable searches and seizures."21  The Supreme Court defines"persons" to include their bodies22 and attire,23 and has extended
Fourth Amendment protection to all areas that a person seeks to
preserve as private, even if those areas are accessible to the public. 4
A search is "per se unreasonable" if it is "conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate."2 This rule
is "subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions."26
Two exceptions to the warrant requirement are discussed in this
Comment: the Terry frisk and the plain view doctrine, both of which
developed on the theory of exigent circumstances. In these contexts,
searches and seizures are exempt from the warrant requirement because
the delay involved in obtaining a warrant would result in physical harm
or in the loss of evidence. While both the Terry frisk and the plain
view doctrine are exceptions to the warrant requirement, searches and
seizures conducted under the plain view doctrine are not exempt from
the requirement that the officer have probable cause to believe that the
item searched is associated with criminal activity.2 Probable cause
is determined with reference to a reasonable person with the expertise
and experience of the officer in question. 9 In other words, the test
is an objective one, and the officer's subjective belief that he had
grounds for his action will be insufficient.3"
Although few would argue that Fourth Amendment rights should
be abandoned, some detractors argue that the exclusionary rule is not
the appropriate remedy for violation of those rights. For example,
some critics believe that the exclusionary rule handcuffs the police and
limits their effectiveness.3 Others argue that it only aids the guilty
and that it does not deter the police from infringing on citizens' rights
to privacy." Finally, some critics are concerned that the exclusionary
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
22. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766-68 (1966).
23. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 18, § 3.2(a) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964)).
24. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-52 (1967).
25. Id. at 357.
26. Id.
27. See generally Justice Robert F. Utter, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law:
1988 Update, 11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 411, 562 (1988).
28. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987); see also 1 JOHN W. HALL, JR., SEARCH
AND SEIZURE 488-89 (2d ed. 1991).
29. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897-98 (1975).
30. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 18, § 3.3(b); see also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97
(1964).
31. Utter, supra note 27, at 592.
32. Id.
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rule will allow guilty people to escape conviction as a result of police
error. These critics propose enacting statutes to provide for a civil
remedy in the form of monetary damages for violations of Fourth
Amendment rights.33
Responses to these criticisms point out that: (1) the Fourth
Amendment restricts unreasonable searches and seizures because
freedom and privacy are preferred over more efficient law enforce-
ment,' (2) the exclusionary rule protects innocent people as well as
the guilty, and (3) the rule really does deter, as illustrated by the fact
that many police departments implemented training programs to teach
officers how to obtain evidence without violating citizens' Fourth
Amendment rights after the exclusionary rule was announced.3"
Moreover, the suggestion of substituting a civil remedy for the
exclusionary rule does not adequately serve the deterrent function.
Civil remedies would not effectively put pressure on police officers
because, in most instances, the damages would be paid by the
government, not by the individual officer.36  In addition, civil
remedies will not be available to everyone. Some will lack the financial
resources to pursue a lawsuit, and those who do pursue a suit may be
unsuccessful because plaintiffs who have been arrested and tried are
unlikely to gain sympathy from jurors. 37
The essence of this debate over the exclusionary rule is the
balancing of citizens' rights to freedom and privacy against the need for
efficient and effective law enforcement.38 The question of an officer's
ability to seize contraband in the context of a stop-and-frisk is the next
step in this continuing debate.
B. The Terry Frisk
Stop-and-frisk jurisprudence begins with the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio,39 in which the Court held,
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing
may be armed and presently dangerous . . . and where nothing in
33. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 397 (1971); see also LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 18, § 3.1(c).
34. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 18, § 3.1(c).
35. Utter, supra note 27, at 592.
36. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 18, § 3.1(c).
37. Id.
38. See generally id.
39. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear
for his own or others' safety, he is entitled ... to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.40
The preceding paragraph describes what is commonly known as
the Terry frisk. The Terry court reached this standard by balancing
the opposing interests of privacy and effective law enforcement and
determined, in the words of Professors LaFave and Israel, that "a brief
stopping for investigation and a frisk incident thereto are permissible
upon grounds falling short of probable cause ... [because they]
involve a significantly lesser intrusion into freedom and privacy. "41
The professors continue their analysis by stating that the lawfulness of
a Terry frisk depends upon two factors: "whether the officer was
rightly in the presence of the party frisked . . . and . . . whether the
officer had a sufficient degree of suspicion that the party frisked was
armed and dangerous."42  Both factors are evaluated against "the
Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures" rather than by the probable cause require-
ment.43
Thus, the standard of proof that must be satisfied for a stop and
frisk is that the officer's observations lead him "reasonably to conclude
... that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous."" Circumstances that might lead an officer to
this conclusion include an unusual bulge in clothing, a sudden
movement toward a pocket or other area that could contain a weapon,
or an awareness that the suspect was armed on previous occasions.4 5
The officer is not required to have probable cause in order to conduct
an investigatory stop or an accompanying frisk for weapons,46 nor
must he actually be in fear.47
The Washington standard for conducting a Terry frisk "requires
officers to have an individualized suspicion that the suspect is presently
40. Id. at 30.
41. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 18, § 3.3(b).
42. Id. § 3.8(e).
43. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
44. Id. at 30.
45. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 18, § 3.8(e).
46. See Utter, supra note 27, at 470, 514 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
47. See United States v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976); see also 3 WAYNE
R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9 .4(a) (2d ed. 1987). But cf. United States v. Lott, 870
F.2d 778, 785 (1st Cir. 1989).
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dangerous."4 For example, the sole fact that the detention occurs in
a high crime area would not be sufficient. 9
The United States Supreme Court clarified the reasonable
suspicion standard in Sibron v. New York," ° the case accompanying
Terry, by stating that a "frisk may not be used as a pretext for a search
for incriminating evidence when the officer has no reasonable grounds
to believe that the suspect is armed."'" Thus, the Court made clear
that a frisk for weapons has a singular purpose: the discovery of
weapons that could be easily grasped and used to harm the officer or
others nearby. 2 In order to seize the weapon, the officer need not be
absolutely certain that the individual is armed. "[T]he question is
whether there was anything in the officer's perception to indicate it was
not a weapon because of its size or density. "" This standard would
theoretically bar a seizure when only a soft object is felt. 4
In the cases following Terry and Sibron, courts have expanded the
traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement by testing police
conduct against a standard of general reasonableness, rather than the
more rigourous standard of probable cause, leading at least one
commentator to conclude that the balance is weighted strongly in favor
of law enforcement, perhaps at the expense of privacy concerns.55
Justice Brennan appears to have agreed. In the conclusion to his
dissenting opinion in Michigan v. Long,s6 he argued that by expanding
the application of the Terry balancing rationale, "the Court [was]
simply continuing the process of distorting Terry beyond recognition
and forcing it into service as an unlikely weapon against the Fourth
Amendment's fundamental requirement that searches and seizures be
based on probable cause." 57
48. Utter, supra note 27, at 524 (citing State v. Hobart, 94 Wash. 2d 437, 446, 617 P.2d
429, 433 (1980)).
49. State v. Smith, 102 Wash. 2d 449, 452-53, 688 P.2d 146, 148 (1984).
50. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
51. Utter, supra note 27, at 524 (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968)). In
Sibron, the officer observed the defendant speaking with known drug addicts in a restaurant.
After some time, the officer told Sibron to leave the restaurant and said, "You know what I am
after." Sibron, 392 U.S. at 45. When Sibron reached into his pocket, the officer reached into the
same pocket and found packets of heroin. Id. The court held that "[tihe suspect's mere act of
talking with a number of known narcotics addicts ... no more gives rise to reasonable fear of life
or limb .. .than it justifies an arrest for committing a crime." Id. at 64.
52. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 47, § 9.4(b).
53. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 18, § 3.8(e).
54. Id.
55. Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
257, 264 (1984).
56. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)..
57. Id. at 1054 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Central to the balancing test in Terry is the idea that a lesser
intrusion is involved in stop-and-frisk cases. 8 Thus, the Supreme
Court originally emphasized that a frisk must "be confined in scope to
an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or
other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer." 59 This
lesser intrusion is based on the premise that the frisk is limited to the
outer clothing of the suspect unless and until the officer becomes aware
that a weapon may be found. It is only at that point that the officer
may intrude underneath the clothing. This limitation protects the
individual because "the officer will not be able to justify an intrusion
beneath the surface of the suspect's clothing without first showing that
he felt a hard object, a matter which often could be subject to later
verification by showing that there was such an object."6
C. The Plain View Doctrine
Under the plain view doctrine, police may seize evidence in plain
view without a warrant as long as the intrusion that allowed the officer
to view the evidence was lawful.61 In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,62
the Supreme Court explained that prior cases involving the seizure of
articles in plain view had three elements in common that supported
application of the doctrine.63  The Washington Supreme Court
followed Coolidge in State v. Daugherty,64 but stated the rule more
succinctly. It stated that in order to seize an item under the plain view
doctrine, the following requirements must all be met: (1) the police
officer must have a prior justification for the intrusion into the
constitutionally protected area;65 (2) the discovery of the incriminating
evidence must be inadvertent;66 and (3) the police must immediately
realize that the object they observe is evidence-that is, the incriminat-
58. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 18, § 3.3(b).
59. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
60. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 47, § 9.4(b).
61. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971); see also LAFAVE & ISRAEL,
supra note 18, § 3.7(o.
62. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
63. Id. at 466.
64. 94 Wash. 2d 263, 616 P.2d 649 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 958 (1981).
65. Id. at 267, 616 P.2d at 651.
66. Id. The inadvertence requirement was rescinded by the United States Supreme Court
in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137-42 (1990). The Washington Supreme Court
apparently intends to drop the requirement because it recognized the change in Hudson, 124
Wash. 2d at 114 n.1, 874 P.2d at 164 n.1, and determined that the change did not affect the
analysis in that case. Id. Similarly, the inadvertence requirement does not alter the arguments
or the analysis pertinent to this Comment.
1995]
Seattle University Law Review
ing character of the evidence must be immediately apparent.67 This
means that probable cause must be determined without further
examination of the object.68 Additionally, any seizure of items in
plain view must be based on probable cause that the items are evidence
of a crime.69
The United States Supreme Court extended the plain view
doctrine to the concept of plain feel in Minnesota v. Dickerson,"
stating that an officer may seize contraband even though the contra-
band was only identified by the sense of touch.71
III. MINNESOTA V. DICKERSON: THE SUPREME COURT'S
RECOGNITION OF THE PLAIN FEEL DOCTRINE UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Facts and Procedural History
At approximately 8:15 p.m. on November 9, 1989, two officers in
a marked squad car spotted Dickerson leaving a known crack house.
The defendant began walking toward the officers, but when he spotted
the squad car, he turned and began walking in the opposite direction.
Based on these facts, the officers decided to stop Dickerson and
investigate further.72
After stopping the defendant, one of the officers conducted a pat-
down search. Although the search revealed no weapons, the officer
noticed a small lump in the defendant's jacket.73 The officer exam-
ined the lump with his fingers and determined that it felt like a piece
of crack cocaine in cellophane. 74  The officer then reached into
Dickerson's pocket and retrieved two tenths of a gram of crack
cocaine.75
Before trial, Dickerson moved to suppress the cocaine but the
motion was denied.76 The Minnesota court of appeals reversed,
declining to adopt the plain feel exception to the warrant require-
67. Daugherty, 94 Wash. 2d at 267, 616 P.2d at 651.
68. See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466; LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 18, § 3.7(f).
69. HALL, supra note 28, at 488-89.
70. 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
71. Id. at 2137.
72. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2133 (1993).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2133-34.
76. Id. at 2134.
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ment." The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals'
holding that "the sense of touch is inherently less immediate and less
reliable than the sense of sight" and "the sense of touch is far more
intrusive into the personal privacy that is at the core of the [F]ourth
[A]mendment."" Moreover, the Minnesota Supreme Court found
that even if it recognized the plain feel exception, the officer in this
case went too far by probing and investigating with his fingers what he
knew was not a weapon.79
B. The United States Supreme Court's Decision
In deciding Dickerson, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed
its position that a pat-down frisk must be strictly "limited to that
which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used
to harm the officer or others nearby,"' and that "[i]f the protective
search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is
armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be sup-
pressed. '"81 Nevertheless, the Court held that "officers may seize
non-threatening contraband detected during a protective patdown
search ... so long as the officer's search stays within the bounds
marked by Terry."82
The Court drew an analogy between plain feel and plain view and
held that the rationale for the plain view exception applied equally well
to circumstances involving touch or feel.83 The rationale behind the
plain view doctrine is that "if contraband .. .is observed by a police
officer from a lawful vantage point, there has been no invasion of...
privacy and thus no 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment-or at least no search independent of the initial intrusion
that gave the officers their vantage point."84  Similarly, the Court
found that if an officer discovers contraband during a pat-down search,
there has been no invasion of the individual's rights beyond that
authorized by the search for weapons, 5 Furthermore, the Court held
77. State v. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d 462, 466 (Mim. Ct. App. 1991), affd, 481 N.W.2d
840 (Minn. 1992), affd, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
78. State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 845 (Minn. 1992), affd, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
79. Id. at 843-44.
80. 113 S. Ct. at 2136 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968)).
81. Id. (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65-66 (1968)).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2137.
84. Id. (citations omitted).
85. Id.
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that a warrantless seizure would be justified by the practical consider-
ation that delay would result in the destruction or loss of evidence.8 6
The Court's application of the plain view analogy is based on the
premise in Terry that "officers will be able to detect the presence of
weapons through the sense of touch,"8" thereby demonstrating that
the sense of touch can be a reliable indicator."8 Like the seizure of
evidence under the plain view doctrine, the seizure of contraband
requires that the officer have probable cause, based on touch through
the outer clothing, to believe that item is, in fact, contraband. 9 The
Court stated that even if the sense of touch is less reliable than sight
or smell with regard to sensing contraband, the probable cause
requirement will act as a sufficient constraint on speculative sei-
zures.90  In other words, because officers must have probable cause
to believe that an item is contraband, if the sense of touch is less
reliable than the sense of sight, officers will have fewer opportunities
to justifiably seize unseen contraband.91
The Court then dismissed the concern that discovery of an item
through the sense of touch is more intrusive than discovery through
the sense of sight.92 The Court found this concern to be unfounded
because the intrusion would already be authorized by the frisk for
weapons. 93
Although the Dickerson court ostensibly recognized the plain feel
doctrine, it found that because the officer continued to explore the
defendant's pocket (by squeezing, sliding, and otherwise manipulating
the contents of the pocket), the search "amounted to the sort of
evidentiary search that Terry expressly refused to authorize and that
[the Court has] condemned in subsequent cases."94 Nevertheless, the
Court determined that contraband may be seized during the course of
a lawful Terry frisk as long as (1) the search does not exceed what is
needed to discover weapons, and (2) the nature of the object is
immediately apparent without further manipulation.9" The decision
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Note that although the pat-down search can be conducted on grounds less than probable
cause, the higher standard of probable cause applies if contraband is to be seized. See supra notes
28-30, 67-69 and accompanying text.
90. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2137-38.
93. Id. at 2138.
94. Id. at 2138-39.
95. Id. at 2136-37.
[Vol. 19:131
19951 The Plain Feel Doctrine in Washington
has been criticized on several grounds that will be raised later in this
Comment.
IV. WASHINGTON LAW BEFORE DICKERSON
Prior to Dickerson, the plain feel doctrine was soundly rejected by
the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Broadnax.96 The Broad-
nax decision was the last in a brief line of state court decisions holding
that the authority to search for weapons could not be extended to seize
other items.97
The first well-known case raising the issue, State v. Allen,9"
involved the search of a suspect's wallet. The Washington Supreme
Court found that upon determining the "bulge" (wallet) was not a
weapon, "the officer had no valid reason to further invade Allen's right
to be free of police intrusion absent reasonable cause to arrest."99
The court reached its decision by relying on several federal cases,
including Terry, and concluded that "once it is ascertained that no
weapon is involved, the government's limited authority to invade the
individual's right to be free of police intrusion is spent."'' 0
The next primary case involving frisks and contraband was State
v. Hobart.01 In that case, the officer discovered two spongy objects
in the defendant's shirt pocket while conducting a pat-down frisk.'02
The officer squeezed the objects and concluded that they were balloons
containing narcotics.'0 3  The court concluded that squeezing the
spongy objects to determine whether they contained narcotics was a
search beyond the scope permitted under the Fourth Amendment
because it included a search for evidence of a crime.'O In addition,
the court found the fact that the defendant had a prior arrest for
narcotics possession, while providing some reason for the officer to
suspect that the defendant was in possession of drugs, did not amount
96. 98 Wash. 2d 289, 298, 654 P.2d 96, 102 (1982).
97. Id. at 299, 654 P.2d at 102; see State v. Loewen, 97 Wash. 2d 562, 647 P.2d 489 (1982);
State v. Hobart, 94 Wash. 2d 437, 617 P.2d 429 (1980); State v. Allen, 93 Wash. 2d 170, 606
P.2d 1235 (1980).
98. 93 Wash. 2d 170, 606 P.2d 1235 (1980).
99. Id. at 172, 606 P.2d at 1236.
100. Id. at 173, 606 P.2d at 1237 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
101. 94 Wash. 2d 437, 617 P.2d 429 (1980).
102. Id. at 439-40, 617 P.2d at 430.
103. Id. at 440, 617 P.2d at 430. The officer did not seize the balloons from the suspect's
pocket at that time but later asked the suspect about them. The suspect then reached for his
pocket and a scuffle ensued. The balloons containing the narcotics were found on the ground
after the scuffle. Id.
104. Id. at 446, 617 P.2d at 433-34.
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to the probable cause needed to conduct a search without a war-
rant.1°5
Furthermore, the officer admitted that he was not searching just
for weapons, but that the search included "an exploration of the
possibility that the defendant might be in possession of narcotics."' 6
This admission apparently persuaded the court to conclude that "[tlo
approve the use of evidence of some offense unrelated to weapons
would be to invite the use of weapons' searches as a pretext for
unwarranted searches, and thus to severely erode the protection of the
Fourth Amendment."'0 7
The seizure of contraband during a protective frisk also arose in
State v. Loewen' °8 during a search of an unconscious woman who had
been involved in a car accident." 9 The officers decided to conduct
the frisk based on a concealed weapons permit they had discovered
while trying to identify the defendant."0 Before placing the defen-
dant in the car to transport her to the hospital, the officer patted her
down and felt a small tubular-shaped object in her pocket."' The
officer then reached in and pulled out a cocaine sniffer."2 The state
supreme court determined that the search was not incident to a lawful
arrest and that its "sole justification" would be the protection of the
officers." 3 However, the actual size of the tube, coupled with one
officer's admission that the search was also to discover drugs,"'
indicated that the search was not limited in scope to the discovery of
weapons. Therefore, the seizure of the sniffer was unlawful."'
With this background, the Washington Supreme Court decided
Broadnax. That case arose during the execution of a search warrant of
Broadnax's home, in which Thompson was present." 6 Although the
105. Id. at 446, 617 P.2d at 433.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 447, 617 P.2d at 434.
108. 97 Wash. 2d 562, 647 P.2d 489 (1982).
109. Id. at 563, 647 P.2d at 490.
110. Id. at 563-64, 647 P.2d at 491.
111. Id. at 564, 647 P.2d at 491.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 567, 647 P.2d at 492.
114. It is interesting to note that Loewen is another case in which the officer admitted that
his search was conducted, in part, to discover drugs. Id. From these decisions, one could argue
that police officers have learned not to admit their actual purposes for conducting searches. This
possibility increases the risk that pretextual searches will occur.
115. Id. at 567, 647 P.2d at 492-93.
116. State v. Broadnax, 25 Wash. App. 704, 705, 612 P.2d 391, 393 (1980), appeal after
remand, 29 Wash. App. 443, 628 P.2d 1332 (1981), rev'd, 98 Wash. 2d 289, 654 P.2d 96
(1982).
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officers had no information linking Thompson to the crime under
investigation, they ordered him to keep his hands on his head while the
search was conducted." 7 About thirty seconds later, another officer
entered the house and asked whether Thompson should be
searched;" 8 he received an affirmative response." 9  This officer
later testified that he searched Thompson under the assumption that
contraband had been found and that Thompson had been placed under
arrest. 2 In fact, Thompson had not been placed under arrest; nor
was there any indication that the officer was concerned that Thompson
may have been armed with a weapon. 2' To the contrary, another
officer at the scene "twice stated that he saw no reason to do a'patdown' for weapons '[a]s long as we could see their hands."" 22
The court first analyzed the case under the holding in Ybarra v.
Illinois.' In that case, the defendant, Ybarra, was a patron of a
public tavern who was frisked during the execution of a search warrant
at the tavern.'24 The United States Supreme Court suppressed the
evidence seized during the patdown because the frisk "was simply not
supported by a reasonable belief that [Ybarra] was armed and presently
dangerous.""12 The court refused to permit the search of individual
patrons by virtue of their mere presence on the premises. 12 6
Based on Ybarra, the Washington Supreme Court found that the
officer had no authority to frisk Thompson solely because he happened
to be present in Broadnax's house.127 The frisk would have been
justified only if the officer had a reasonable suspicion that Thompson
was armed and dangerous. 2 Furthermore, the court held, even if
the frisk had been justified, it exceeded the permissible scope of a
Terry frisk because the officer did not believe that he was retrieving a
weapon when he reached into Thompson's pocket and removed a
balloon containing heroin.' 29
117. Broadnax, 98 Wash. 2d at 291-92, 654 P.2d at 98-99.
118. Id. at 292, 654 P.2d at 99.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 292-93, 654 P.2d at 99.
122. Id. at 293, 654 P.2d at 99 (quoting Report of Proceedings at 21).
123. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
124. Id. at 88.
125. Id. at 92-93.
126. Id. at 91-92.
127. See Broadnax, 98 Wash. 2d at 295-96, 654 P.2d at 101.
128. See id. at 296, 654 P.2d at 101.
129. Id. at 297, 654 P.2d at 101.
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The court also found that the search did not fall within the plain
view exception because the immediately apparent requirement was not
met:
[T]he [immediately apparent] requirement is not met if the sense of
touch is relied upon exclusively for the recognition of contraband.
The tactile sense does not usually result in the immediate knowledge
of the nature of the item. The officer in this case could not know
the bulge was a balloon containing heroin. His observations lacked"the distinctive character of the smell of marijuana or the hardness
of a weapon."130
The court went on to distinguish the sense of touch from that of
sight or smell because sight and smell do not involve a physical
intrusion of one's person, while evidence discovered by the tactile sense
does. 3' Thus, the court concluded that the plain feel doctrine
should not be adopted because it is less reliable and involves more of
a physical intrusion than plain smell or plain view.132
Nevertheless, after the United States Supreme Court decided
Dickerson, the Washington Supreme Court reversed its position and
stated that the sense of touch can reveal evidence that will be admissi-
ble at trial.133
V. WASHINGTON LAW AFTER DICKERSON: STATE V. HUDSON
AND STATE V. TZINTZUN-JIMENEZ
Two cases have been decided in Washington since the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Dickerson: State v. Hudson'34 and
State v. Tzintzun-Jimenez. 35 Hudson involved an undercover drug
operation in which the defendant was the suspected supplier.136 The
police officers observed two controlled buys between a confidential
police informant and Kelly Higgins. 137 During the first buy, Hudson
arrived and spent a few minutes in the trailer where the transaction was
taking place and then left. 3  The second purchase occurred the next
130. Id. at 298, 654 P.2d at 102 (quoting State v. Broadnax, 25 Wash. App. 704, 718, 612
P.2d 391, 399 (1980) (Ringold, J., dissenting), appeal after remand, 29 Wash. App. 443, 628 P.2d
1332 (1981), rev'd, 98 Wash. 2d 289, 654 P.2d 96 (1982)).
131. Id. at 298, 654 P.2d at 102.
132. Id. at 298-99, 654 P.2d at 102.
133. See State v. Hudson, 124 Wash. 2d 107, 109, 874 P.2d 160, 161 (1994).
134. 124 Wash. 2d 107, 874 P.2d 160 (1994).
135. 72 Wash. App. 852, 866 P.2d 667 (1994).
136. Hudson, 124 Wash. 2d at 109-10, 874 P.2d at 161-62.
137. Id. at 109, 874 P.2d at 161-62.
138. Id. at 109, 874 P.2d at 161.
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day.139 Before paying Higgins, the informant insisted that she have
the drugs in hand. In order to comply, Higgins left the trailer and
returned a few moments later. 40 After the sale was completed, the
officer placed Higgins under arrest.' 4'
The officers, believing that the source of the drugs would come
looking for the money, waited on the steps of the trailer until Hudson
arrived.'42 Because Hudson refused to remove his hands from his
pockets when the officers ordered and because they feared he might be
armed, the officers proceeded to conduct a pat-down search.'43
During the search, one officer felt what he described as "a quite
substantial bulge, hard something" in Hudson's jacket pocket.'44
Not sure whether the hard object was or was not a weapon, the officer
reached into the pocket.'45 The officer then instantly recognized the
hard object as a pager.'46 He also felt paperwork and a baggie
containing a "ragged edge chunk," which the officer claimed he "knew
immediately ... was likely cocaine."' 47  The officer removed the
baggie, placed the defendant under arrest, and searched the rest of
Hudson's pockets, which revealed additional baggies of cocaine and a
large quantity of money.4 '
Relying on the state supreme court's decision in Broadnax, both
the trial court and the Division I Court of Appeals ruled that the
cocaine was not admissible.'49 The court of appeals found that
Washington "ha[d] not recognized a plain touch exception to the
search warrant requirement"' 0 and that even if such an exception
were recognized, the "suppression was proper because substantial
evidence supported a finding that the detective did not have immediate
knowledge that the substance was cocaine."'' Thus, according to
the court of appeals, the trial court's suppression of the evidence was
proper.' 52
139. Id. at 109, 874 P.2d at 161-62.
140. Id. at 109, 874 P.2d at 162.
141. Id.
142. id. at 109-10, 874 P.2d at 162.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 110, 874 P.2d at 162.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 111, 874 P.2d at 162-63.
150. Id. at 111, 874 P.2d at 163 (quoting State v. Hudson, 69 Wash. App. 270, 275, 848
P.2d 216, 220 (1993), vev'd, 124 Wash. 2d 107, 874 P.2d 160 (1994)).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 111, 874 P.2d at 163.
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The Washington Supreme Court granted review and held that
"the trial court and the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that
Broadnax precluded such a plain touch exception."'1 3  The court
went on to repeat much of the holding in Broadnax while casting a
different light on the decision as "merely acknowledg[ing] that touch
alone cannot 'usually' result in immediate recognition of contra-
band."' '54 Consequently, while the court continues to assert that "the
sense of touch is inherently less immediate and less accurate than other
senses,""' the court's conclusion in Hudson is the exact opposite of
its holding in Broadnax. In Hudson, the court followed the United
States Supreme Court's lead and decided that touch can satisfy the
requirements of plain view "[i]f recognition of the contraband is as
immediate and as accurate as recognition of a weapon. '-15 6
Analyzing the facts in light of this holding, the Washington
Supreme Court raised the question of whether the officer immediately
recognized the contraband."3 7 The court indicated that in order to
satisfy the immediately apparent prong of the plain feel doctrine, the
officer's suspicion must rise to the level of probable cause. 8 The
court stated that although the facts may have supported an inference
that the detective immediately recognized the contents of the baggie,
the officer's detailed testimony indicated that he had manipulated the
baggie and exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk." 9
The supreme court also found that the trial court failed to make
a clear finding of probable cause. 60 The officer's testimony that the
substance was "likely" to be or was "consistent with" cocaine was not"sufficiently certain to constitute an immediate knowledge that it [was]
cocaine.' 6 ' Therefore, the court remanded the case to the trial court
to determine whether the "nature of the particular object ... is such
that there can be a credible claim of recognition by touch' 62 or
whether the object could have been consistent with "hard rock candy,
a food item, a small part to a car, or some other such item.' 63
153. Id. at 114, 874 P.2d at 164.
154. Id. at 115, 874 P.2d at 165.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 117, 874 P.2d at 165-66.
158. See id. at 118, 874 P.2d at 166 (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987)).
159. Id. at 118-19, 874 P.2d at 166-67.
160. Id. at 119, 874 P.2d at 167.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 120, 874 P.2d at 167 (citing United States v. Pace, 709 F. Supp. 948 (C.D. Cal.
1989), affd, 893 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1990)).
163. Id. at 119-120, 874 P.2d at 167.
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Because the facts of Hudson indicate that the officer manipulated
the object before recognizing it as contraband,' 4 it appears that the
end result in Hudson may be identical to Dickerson. That is, the trial
court, on remand, will probably conclude that the nature of the
contraband was not immediately apparent to the officer, thereby
making the seizure unlawful. In such circumstances, the evidence must
be suppressed.
Although the Hudson court briefly addressed Hudson's claim that
he was entitled to greater protections under the Washington Constitu-
tion, it found that Hudson's failure to raise the issue until his
supplemental brief precluded its consideration of the issue. 6 ' Thus,
the court's decision raises, but does not answer, the question of
whether it would reach a different conclusion if persuaded to consider
the plain feel doctrine under article I, section 7 of the Washington
Constitution.
The other decision recognizing the plain feel doctrine in Washing-
ton, State v. Tzintzun-Jimenez,6 6 emerged from the Division II
Court of Appeals. Although this decision preceded the supreme
court's ruling in Hudson, the court of appeals had a clear indication
that the supreme court was considering adopting the plain feel doctrine
because the supreme court had instructed the parties arguing Hudson
to address the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Dickerson.'67
The facts of Tzintzun-Jimenez are somewhat different from the
facts in Hudson because the contraband came to light during a scuffle
that began after the officer commenced a pat-down frisk.16 The
defendant pulled away from the detective during the frisk, and the
officer, in an attempt to gain control, hooked his fingers into the
defendant's pocket where he felt a "slippery material."' 69 When the
officer removed his fingers from the pocket, he pulled out the slippery
material, which turned out to be a baggie of cocaine.170 Once again,
the case turned on the immediate recognition prong of the plain feel
test.171
164. Id. at 118-19, 874 P.2d at 166.
165. Id. at 120, 874 P.2d at 167.
166. 72 Wash. App. 852, 866 P.2d 667 (1994).
167. Compare State v. Tzintzun-Jimenez decided February 4, 1994 with State v. Hudson
petition for review granted October 7, 1993. 122 Wash. 2d 1009, 863 P.2d 64 (1993).
168. Tzintzun-Jimenez, 72 Wash. App. at 853, 866 P.2d at 668.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 857, 866 P.2d at 670.
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The court of appeals found that the evidence should have been
suppressed because there was no finding that the officer knew the
material was "likely to be cocaine."'7 In light of the supreme court's
finding in Hudson, however, it now appears that even knowing the
object was likely to be cocaine would not have been sufficient. In
Hudson, the court found that the officer's testimony that the substance
in question was likely to be cocaine was "not the same or sufficiently
certain to constitute an immediate knowledge that it [was] co-
caine."' 73  Moreover, the court of appeals rested its decision on the
Fourth Amendment and federal precedent, once again failing to
consider whether the discovery of contraband under the plain feel
exception might involve an unreasonable intrusion into Washington
citizens' privacy rights under the state constitution.
VI. THE HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE UNDER THE
WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE I, SECTION 7
The privacy language of the Washington Constitution differs
substantially from the language of the Fourth Amendment,174 and
has prompted Washington courts to place a greater emphasis on
protecting individual rights than on curbing governmental action. 75
Consequently, Washington courts have, at times, provided greater
protection of individual privacy rights under article I, section 7 than
federal courts have provided under the Fourth Amendment.'76
Article I, section 7 provides, "No person shall be disturbed in his
private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.' 177
Although this language differs significantly from the Fourth Amend-
ment and does not mention any prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures, article I, section 7 is considered to be the state
corollary to the Fourth Amendment. 7 1 The difference in wording
172. Id. at 858, 866 P.2d at 670.
173. See Hudson, 124 Wash. 2d at 119, 874 P.2d at 167.
174. Compare WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 ("No person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.") with U.S. CONST. amend. IV
(guaranteeing "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures").
175. State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 92, 110, 640 P.2d 1061, 1071 (1982); see also Utter, supra
note 27, at 591.
176. See Kurt Walters, Comment, The Stop and Frisk Doctrine in Washington and the Rise
and Fall of Independent State Constitutional Analysis, 64 WASH. L. REV. 179, 179 (1989) (citing
State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984)).
177. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 (emphasis added).
178. See State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 510-11, 688 P.2d 151, 154 (1984) (stating that
"Const. art. 1, § 7 analysis encompasses those legitimate privacy expectations protected by the
Fourth Amendment"). One basis for this conclusion may be that the originally proposed
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of the two provisions, however, has prompted Washington courts to
focus on different policy justifications when applying the exclusionary
rule to evidence seized during searches. While the United States
Supreme Court primarily emphasizes the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule in its decisions,'79 the Washington Supreme Court
emphasizes the protection of individual rights."8
In defining the difference between article I, section 7 and the
Fourth Amendment, the Washington Supreme Court stated that,
unlike the Fourth Amendment, article I, section 7 clearly recognizes an
individual's right to privacy with no express limitations.' Thus,
while application of the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amend-
ment turns on whether police misconduct will actually be deterred,'82
application of the rule under article I, section 7 may be automat-
ic183 -- it may not be influenced by the fact that in certain cases
exclusion of the evidence has no deterrent effect on unlawful police
conduct.
For many years, the Washington Supreme Court has relied on this
reasoning to extend greater privacy protections to Washington citizens.
For instance, in United States v. Robinson,"8 4 the United States
Supreme Court held that a full body search incident to a lawful arrest
is reasonable, per se, under the Fourth Amendment.' "Washington
... rejected this approach under [its] own constitution[] and require[s]
full body searches to be reasonable and no broader than necessary
under the circumstances."' 86  Similarly, while the United States
Supreme Court has held that a defendant has no standing to object to
the search of premises owned by another person,'87 Washington
allows a defendant charged with a possessory offense automatic
standing to challenge the search without regard to who owns the
language of section 7 was identical to the Fourth Amendment. THE JOURNAL OF THE
WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889, at 497 (Beverly P. Rosenow ed.,
1962).
179. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984).
180. Utter, supra note 27, at 591 (citing State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 92, 110-12, 640 P.2d
1061, 1071-72 (1982)).
181. White, 97 Wash. 2d at 110, 640 P.2d at 1070-71.
182. Terry, 392 U.S. at 12.
183. Justice Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on
State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 491,
501-02 (1984).
184. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
185. Id. at 235.
186. Utter, supra note 183, at 501 (citing State v. Hehman, 14 Wash. App. 770, 773, 544
P.2d 1257, 1260 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 90 Wash. 2d 45, 578 P.2d 527 (1978)).
187. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 86-95 (1980).
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premises searched.' 8 A final example is the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Michigan v. DeFillippo,'89 in which the Court
held that the Fourth Amendment did not require the exclusion of
evidence obtained during an arrest that was made in reliance on a
subsequently invalided statute. 90  In contrast, the Washington
Supreme Court ruled, in State v. White,"9' that evidence obtained
under a statute, which is later determined to be unconstitutional, must
be excluded.192
As these cases illustrate, the Washington Supreme Court
distinguished article I, section 7 from the Fourth Amendment in
several cases during the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, in a
1986 case, State v. Gunwall,93 the court announced that in future
cases, a determination of whether the Washington Constitution should
extend broader rights than the federal constitution will be made only
after consideration of the following six nonexclusive criteria: (1) the
textual language; (2) differences in texts; (3) constitutional history; (4)
pre-existing state law; (5) structural differences; and (6) matters of
particular state or local concern.'94 These criteria are intended to
provide guidance to practitioners by identifying what the court
considers relevant in determining whether the state constitution should
be interpreted to provide greater protection than the federal constitu-
tion.195
In Gunwall, the court applied these criteria in the context of a
search conducted through wiretapping and concluded that the
Washington Constitution provides greater privacy protections than
does the Fourth Amendment. With regard to the first and second
criteria, the court found that, unlike the text of the Fourth Amend-
ment, the text of article I, section 7 explicitly focuses on a citizen's"private affairs."'19 6 In addition, the state constitutional history (the
third criterion) shows that the framers specifically rejected a proposal
to adopt language identical to that of the Fourth Amendment. "'
Under the fourth criterion, the court determined that Washington has
188. Utter, supra note 183, at 502 (citing State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 179, 622 P.2d
1199, 1205 (1980)).
189. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
190. Id. at 35-38.
191. 97 Wash. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982).
192. Id. at 102-04, 640 P.2d at 1067-68.
193. 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
194. See id. at 58, 720 P.2d at 811.
195. See id. at 62, 720 P.2d at 813.
196. Id. at 65, 720 P.2d at 814.
197. Id. at 65-66, 720 P.2d at 814.
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"a long history of extending strong protections to telephonic ...
communications. '  The court also found, in analyzing the fifth
criterion, that while the federal "[c]onstitution is a grant of limited
power ... [the] state constitution imposes limitations on the otherwise
plenary power of the state to do anything not expressly forbidden by
the state constitution or federal law."' 99 The court did not specifical-
ly analyze the sixth criterion finding that the issues involved over-
lapped those outlined in the discussion of the fourth criterion.2"'
Two years after Gunwall, the Washington Supreme Court held
that if a party fails to discuss the Gunwall criteria when arguing that
the state constitution provides greater protection than the federal
constitution, the court will refuse to consider the matter on the ground
that it was insufficiently argued.2' Two years later, the court held
that in challenging a search or seizure under article I, section 7, a party
need only address the fourth and sixth criteria because the other
criteria have already been established in the context of searches and
seizures. 20 2 Therefore, because the plain feel doctrine is a matter of
search and seizure, only the fourth and sixth criteria require detailed
examination.
The fourth Gunwall factor examines pre-existing state law. Prior
to its decision in State v. Hudson,20 3 the Washington Supreme Court
held that evidence seized under the plain feel exception should be
suppressed. 204  But because those cases preceded the Gunwall deci-
sion, each was decided by analyzing the protections provided by the
Fourth Amendment. It was not until the United States Supreme Court
issued its decision in Dickerson that an independent evaluation based
on the state constitution became necessary. It is clear, however, that
pre-existing state law under article I, section 7 has provided greater
privacy protections to the citizens of Washington. 20 5
198. Id. at 66, 720 P.2d at 815.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 67, 720 P.2d at 815.
201. See State v. Wethered, 110 Wash. 2d 466, 475, 755 P.2d 797, 802 (1988); Utter, supra
note 27, at 422.
202. See State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 576, 800 P.2d 1112, 1114 (1990).
203. 124 Wash. 2d 107, 874 P.2d 160 (1994).
204. See supra notes 98-132 and accompanying text.
205. See Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 510, 688 P.2d at 153 (explaining that a recent series of
cases recognized that the unique language of article I, section 7 provides greater protections to
Washington citizens); State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 443, 688 P.2d 136, 143 (1984); White,
97 Wash. 2d at 110, 640 P.2d at 1071; see also supra notes 174-92 and accompaning text.
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For example, in Washington v. Chrisman,°6 the United States
Supreme Court found that, subsequent to an arrest, it was not
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment for an officer to enter the
defendant's dorm room because the officer needed to monitor the
movements of the arrested person. 7 On remand, the Washington
Supreme Court concluded that the officer had no prior justification for
entering the room, and that the state had failed to meet its burden of
proving a compelling need under the state constitution. 20 8 Thus, the
plain view doctrine could not be used to justify the seizure of evidence
that was seen only after the police officer entered the room.209
The sixth Gunwall factor examines whether the matter is of
particular local or state concern. Application of the plain feel doctrine
is a matter of state concern because Washington's exclusionary rule is
particularly intended to protect individual privacy interests. 0 While
the Fourth Amendment establishes a baseline for determining when
searches and seizures are unreasonable, article I, section 7 affirmatively
protects the private affairs of Washington citizens.2 ' Thus, the state
constitution has distinguished privacy interests as a matter of state
concern, separate from the protections provided by the Fourth
Amendment. Furthermore, there is no overriding need for national
uniformity as long as all states provide for the minimum protections
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. The Washington Supreme
Court has demonstrated its agreement with this proposition by
providing greater protection in other search and seizure cases.212
The stage is now set for the Washington Supreme Court to find
that article I, section 7 provides greater privacy protection for the
citizens of Washington by prohibiting the search or seizure of
contraband during a Terry frisk. In the words of Justice Utter, "An
independent interpretation and application of the Washington
Constitution is not just legitimate, historically mandated, and logically
essential; it is . . . a 'duty' that all state courts owe to the people of
Washington. 213
206. 455 U.S. 1 (1982).
207. Id. at 7.
208. State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 822, 676 P.2d 419, 424 (1984).
209. Id.
210. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d at 577, 800 P.2d at 1115; State v. Bonds, 98 Wash. 2d 1, 12,
653 P.2d 1024, 1031 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 (1983); White, 97 Wash. 2d at 108-10, 640
P.2d at 1070-71; see also supra notes 174-83 and accompanying text.
211. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
212. See supra notes 184-92 and accompanying text.
213. Utter, supra note 183, at 499.
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VII. ARGUMENT
A. The Plain Feel Doctrine Should Not Be Recognized In
Washington Because the Washington Constitution Confers Greater
Civil Liberty Protections than the Federal Constitution
The Washington Supreme Court has "often independently
evaluated [the] state constitution and [has] concluded that it should be
applied to confer greater civil liberties than its federal counterpart." '214
The court has also recognized, however, that cooperation in the form
of some "consistency and uniformity between state and federal
governments in certain areas of judicial administration is desir-
able."2 " Thus, the crux of the conflict is determining when the
protection of individual rights outweighs the desire for uniformity, an
issue that depends on the fundamental principles of the state constitu-
tion. "A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to
the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free govern-
ment."21 6  The fundamental purpose of our state's constitution and
government is "to protect and maintain individual rights. 217
"[A]rticle 1, section 7 of the Washington Constitution provides express
constitutional protection for certain privacy rights of Washington
citizens. '21  Thus, the State, in order to protect individual rights,
must carefully consider whether the right to frisk and discover
contraband is so essential to the State's interest that the personal
privacy of our citizens may be violated in that way. Because the plain
feel doctrine is used strictly to discover evidence, and because it is
highly unlikely that a great number of convictions will be achieved
through its application, the balance should fall in favor of protecting
the privacy interests of Washington citizens. Moreover, because state
courts are not as constrained in exercising their power as are the federal
courts, they are able to experiment with broader social policies. Unlike
the United States Supreme Court, which because its decisions have
broad application must choose the "lowest common denominator of
individual rights," state courts are "left free to try a broad range of
214. Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 238, 635 P.2d
108, 113 (1981).
215. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 60, 720 P.2d at 812 (citing State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 964
(N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring)).
216. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 32.
217. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1,
218. Utter, supra note 183, at 495.
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social, political, and legal experiments." '219 Thus, state courts are free
to provide greater privacy protection to their citizens by rejecting
application of the plain feel doctrine.
B. The Plain Feel Doctrine Should Not be Recognized In Washington
Due to the Number of Problems Such Application Creates
Despite its recognition of the plain feel doctrine in theory,
Washington courts have never applied it to admit evidence discovered
by the sense of touch during a Terry frisk.22 Moreover, because the
immediately apparent requirement has not been met, evidence of
contraband has not been admitted in any of the cases that recognized
the plain feel doctrine.221 Thus, this may be the perfect time for the
Washington Supreme Court to consider whether Washington citizens
who are subject to a Terry frisk are entitled to greater protection under
article I, section 7. Because of the difficulties with the doctrine-its
impossible standard of certainty, its potential for abuse, and the fact
that its application is not necessary for effective law enforce-
ment-Washington courts should reject its application to the discovery
of contraband during a pat-down frisk.
The standard of certainty required by the plain feel doctrine will
almost never be met; thus, few officers will be able to use the doctrine
to justify a search or seizure, and few courts will admit the evidence
once seized. The high standard of certainty required by the doctrine
is found in its immediately apparent requirement. Although this
requirement has often been equated to a probable cause standard,222
it appears that officers must, in fact, have something more than
219. Id. at 496.
220. This statement reflects only published Washington opinions. See, e.g., State v.
Hudson, 124 Wash. 2d 107, 874 P.2d 160 (1994); State v. Loewen, 97 Wash. 2d 562, 647 P.2d
489 (1982); State v. Broadnax, 98 Wash. 2d 289, 654 P.2d 96 (1982).
221. In Dickerson, the United States Supreme Court held that the officer's own testimony
"belie[d] any notion" of immediate recognition because he "determined that the lump was
contraband only after 'squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the
defendant's pocket."' 113 S. Ct. at 2138 (quoting State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 844
(Minn. 1992)). Similarly, in Hudson, the Washington Supreme Court remanded the case for a
factual determination of whether the recognition of the contraband was immediate because the
particularity with which the officer described the substance indicated the possibility of excessive
manipulation. 124 Wash. 2d at 119-120, 874 P.2d at 167. Finally, in Tzintzun-Jimenez, the court
of appeals suppressed the evidence because there was no finding that the officer identified the
material as cocaine before removing the item from the defendant's pocket. 72 Wash. App. at 858,
866 P.2d at 167.
222. See George M. Dery Il, The Uncertain Reach of the Plain Touch Doctrine: An
Examination of Minnesota v. Dickerson and Its Impact on Current Fourth Amendment Law and
Daily Police Practice, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 385, 398 (1994).
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probable cause-they must have some higher level of immediate
certainty."' For instance, the Hudson court stated that the officer's
belief must amount to more than just the likelihood that the item is
contraband; it must be a certainty.2 24
As illustrated by the results in Hudson and Tzintzun-Jimenez,
evidence seized under the plain feel doctrine will frequently be found
inadmissible because officers will rarely be certain of the illegal nature
of an object without first manipulating it. Although proponents of the
plain feel doctrine argue that the reliability of the sense of touch has
been proved by its use to discover weapons,225 they ignore the fact
that "guns and knives are generally of a large size, a heavy feel and a
particular shape that immediately distinguish them from other
articles. 226 The same is not necessarily true of contraband. Because
drugs can be, and often are, carried in small quantities of a gram or
less,22 7 what could be a small amount of cocaine could also be many
other objects that are not crime-related and are not seizable, such as
"hard rock candy, a food item, or a small part to a car." 228 There-
fore, the immediately apparent prong will rarely be met by the initial
pat of an item through the suspect's clothing.
Furthermore, the sense of touch is much less reliable than the
sense of sight: "A tactile encounter generally will provide less
information than a visual encounter, primarily because the sighting will
usually be of the incriminating object itself, while the tactile contact
will usually be with something that surrounds the object in ques-
tion. '229 This diminished reliability along with other variables make
the plain feel exception to the warrant requirement highly questionable.
For example, because the item felt will be covered by clothing, "a
person's possessory interests and ... reasonable expectation of privacy
... will be affected by clothing thickness. '230  Lay persons are not
223. See id. at 405-06.
224. 124 Wash. 2d at 119, 874 P.2d at 167.
225. See Linda F. Beuthe, Note, Minnesota v. Dickerson: Police Can Seize Nonthreatening
Contraband Without Warrant if Found During Frisk; Extension of Plain-View Doctrine, 20 J.
CONTEMP. L. 245, 249 (1994); see also Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
226. Dery, supra note 222, at 395-96.
227. In Dickerson, for example, the defendant had only one-fifth of one gram of crack cocaine
in his pocket. 113 S. Ct. at 2133-34.
228. Hudson, 124 Wash. 2d at 119, 874 P.2d at 167.
229. David L. Haselkorn, Comment, The Case Against a Plain Feel Exception to the Warrant
Requirement, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 683, 695 (1987).
230. Dery, supra note 222, at 395.
1995]
Seattle University Law Review
likely to consider how their choice of apparel may affect their legal
rights.2 31
In light of this strict constraint on the perception of officers, it is
questionable how useful the plain feel doctrine will be in the fight
against drug crimes. Many prosecutors will probably instruct officers
not to seize objects in reliance on the plain feel doctrine because it will
be narrowly construed by the courts and rarely, if ever, applied.
Furthermore, the strict standards of the exception will result in
extended fact-specific hearings at great expense to the public.
Consequently, the few convictions obtained as a result of this exception
will not justify the vast amount of money that will be spent litigating
the issue.
Not only does the plain feel doctrine require a standard of
certainty that can rarely be met, it permits searches that are highly
intrusive and invites its abuse by law enforcement personnel.
Proponents of the doctrine argue that the intrusiveness of a search for
contraband is justified on two grounds. First, they argue that the
seizure of contraband is no more intrusive than the seizure of a weapon
23in similar circumstances.32 However, the intrusiveness involved in
seizing a weapon is justified by the need to protect the safety of officers
and other nearby. The seizure of contraband is not justified by similar
safety concerns.
Second, proponents argue that the seizure of contraband is
justified by the desire to detect evidence of a crime and prevent its
destruction.233 However, the United States Supreme Court "has
recognized that concern over destruction of evidence is a very weak
ground on which to base an exception to the warrant requirement.
The loss of some evidence is accepted as the cost of maintaining the
sanctity of the [F]ourth [A]mendment. '234  The same can be said of
article I, section 7, particularly because Washington's application of the
exclusionary rule focuses on the protection of individual rights.23 5
Moreover, the court must recognize the potential for abuse that
the plain feel doctrine poses to each individual's privacy rights. The
Washington Constitution purports to protect the privacy interests of
our citizens to a greater degree, in many cases, than the federal
constitution. 236 Privacy expectations are measured by a "twofold
231. See id.
232. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2138.
233. See Haselkorn, supra note 229, at 696-97.
234. Id. at 697 (citations omitted).
235. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 174-83 and accompanying text.
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requirement": First, the person must "have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy." Second, the expectation must "be
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' 237  The
reasonable expectation of privacy can also be measured by "whether
the incriminating evidence was seen or heard from a place accessible to
people who are not unusually inquisitive. 238
Application of these tests to the discovery of contraband during
a pat-down frisk reveals that such contraband is protected by the state
constitution. First, a person who places items inside or underneath his
or her clothing unquestionably has an actual, subjective expectation of
privacy in those items-the citizen intends to protect them from public
view. Second, most citizens would agree that it is reasonable for that
person to expect those items to remain private. Finally, only unusually
inquisitive individuals would gain access to those items. Thus, they
are subjects of a citizen's privacy interests and are protected by the
state constitution.
The proponents of the plain feel doctrine argue that contact with
items inside the clothing only occurs when the officer has sufficient
cause to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous.2 39  Thus,
they argue, there is no greater invasion of privacy than could lawfully
occur. However, the possibility remains that officers will be encour-
aged to search for weapons in a greater number of cases, particularly
when patrolling in high drug-crime areas, whether or not they believe
the suspect is armed. 40 Moreover, once officers have initiated the
search, they may "inappropriately reach for plain touch by ...
rush[ing] to a conclusion of probable cause before the nebulous sense
of touch merits it,. . . or [by being] tempted to prolong their patdowns
in order to increase their ability to form probable cause." '' It is not
farfetched to conclude that officers will attempt to rationalize prolonged
searches by arguing that advanced technology is allowing "ever-more-
dangerous weapons [to be] built in ever-decreasing sizes. "242
237. Utter, supra note 27, at 424 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
238. Id. (citing United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1980)).
239. See Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
240. Similar concerns have been voiced regarding pretextual arrests in order to conduct a
search incident to arrest. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 18, § 3.5(b).
241. Dery, supra note 222, at 402.
242. Id. at 403.
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In addition, most officers manipulate the objects before concluding
that they are contraband.243 Because such evidence has been exclud-
ed by Washington courts, officers know they should not admit they
were searching for anything but weapons, nor that they did more than
pat the object before determining it was contraband, regardless of the
facts of the case. This state of affairs invites abuse because only the
officer will know for sure whether he examined the object after
establishing probable cause in his mind or whether he had probable
cause because he or she digitally examined the object.244
The plain feel doctrine, in addition to being highly intensive and
subject to abuse, is also completely unnecessary. If officers restrict
their frisk to a limited pat-down and abide by the probable cause
standard, they will be unable to seize contraband because of their lack
of certainty. Thus, there is no need for the courts to recognize such
an exception to the warrant requirement. Furthermore, the officer's
perception of the object through the suspect's clothing may provide
sufficient cause for the officer to place the suspect under arrest. Once
arrested, the suspect may be searched under the search-incident-to-
arrest exception, which would allow removal of all items from the
arrestee's clothing.243
Despite these difficulties with the plain feel doctrine-its
impossible standard of certainty, its potential for abuse, and the fact
that its application is not necessary for effective law enforce-
ment-proponents of the doctrine assert various arguments in its favor.
For example, supporters of the doctrine argue that officers should not
be required to turn their backs on patent unlawfulness.2 46 However,
because the item in question is typically in the suspect's clothing, not
in plain sight, it can rarely be characterized as patent unlawfulness.
For example, one would not expect an officer to ignore a marijuana
joint sitting in plain view on a car seat; yet if the same object were in
a coat pocket rather than on a car seat, the officer would rarely be able
to identify it with certainty. Thus, the officer is not ignoring evidence
of a crime because he is not certain it is such. The court of appeals
took this view in Tzintzun-Jimenez when it noted that by not seizing
the slippery material in the defendant's pocket, the officer was not
required to ignore his experience because there was no indication that
243. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
244. See Baker, Note, "I Examined It with My Fingers": Immediate Recognition Is Key in
"Plain Feel" Cases According to the United States Supreme Court, ARMY LAW., Aug. 1993, at 35,
37.
245. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
246. Haselkorn, supra note 229, at 694.
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the officer possessed sufficient information to identify the item as
cocaine.247
Supporters of the plain feel doctrine also argue that the seizure of
contraband under the doctrine is not harmful to most defendants
because the inevitable discovery doctrine allows discovery of the same
evidence once the suspect is arrested. 4 Under this rule, evidence
that is discovered as a result of improper police conduct is admissible
if the prosecution can show that "the information. inevitably would
have been discovered by lawful means. 2 49  However, there will
undoubtedly be cases where a citizen's rights are violated by a
warrantless search, but no evidence of a crime is found. In these
situations the inevitable discovery rule has no application.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although the Washington Supreme Court adopted the plain feel
doctrine in reliance on federal precedent and the Fourth Amendment,
the doctrine has yet to be applied to allow the admission of evidence
of contraband that was seized during a protective frisk for weapons.
In each case raising the issue of plain feel, the officers exceeded the
scope of the Terry frisk and the evidence was suppressed. Arguably
then, the language recognizing plain feel is simply dicta upon which
future courts can choose to rely or not, and which the Washington
Supreme Court can certainly ignore by holding otherwise in future
cases.
Moreover, the constitutionality of the exception has not yet been
argued under article I, section 7, which protects the private affairs of
Washington citizens. Now is the time for defense attorneys to argue
the requirements of the state constitution and for the courts to
reconsider their position in light of the inherent problems in applying
such a doctrine to items like contraband, which come in many different
shapes and sizes, most of which are not unique to drugs.
The doctrine, as applied, has been so narrowly construed that one
wonders if officers can actually satisfy the immediately apparent
requirement or if they should even be encouraged to try. Washington
247. See 72 Wash. App. at 858, 866 P.2d at 670.
248. The inevitable discovery doctrine is defined in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444
(1984), and State v. White, 76 Wash. App. 801, 808, 888 P.2d 169, 173 (1995), review granted,
127 Wash. 2d 1017. 904 P.2d 300 (1995). Until the White decision, Washington had specifically
declined to adopt this doctrine. See Utter, supra note 27, at 605-06. One might argue that this
recent development is another area where the Washington Supreme Court should continue to
distinguish state constitutional protections from those of the federal constitution.
249. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.
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has a long history of providing greater protection for its citizens while
balancing the needs of law enforcement. This is one instance in which
the federal precedents provide an unnecessary and unwieldy tool that
should not be adopted in Washington.
